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ABSTRACT
Techniques are described herein to facilitate deterministic networking based on
Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN) for Substation Automation Networks (SANs). The use
of adaptive configuration of filtering and policing for TSN-streams allows the
implementation and operation of a secure converged process bus architecture and supports
the approach of a fully digital substation.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
Within the electrical power grid, electrical substations are an essential component.
Electrical substations typically contain primary (transformer, electrical switching gear) and
secondary equipment (automation, control, and communication gear). Automation and
control networks interconnect these devices and system and enable critical functions.
Reliability and availability are key concerns that can impact the safety and overall
functionality of the automation system. TSN can provide hard isolation and network slicing
for control networks. This is especially important for the process bus, connecting substation
devices to the field equipment. Current process bus deployments do not allow a multiservice architecture. Instead, because of security and reliability concerns, they simply
transport the measurement data (sampled values).
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.1 TSN standards
are new to power automation. They exist as a network technology only with no integration
and orchestration with the upper-layer protocols (e.g., International Electrotechnical
Commission (IEC) 61850) and applications. The techniques described herein close this gap.
They specify a method to configure and orchestrate an adaptive policing and filtering
mechanism to protect critical process traffic and to allow best-effort communication over
the same physical network.
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Substation Automation Networks (SANs) based on IEC 61850, the leading
standard in this domain, consist of two Ethernet-based segments: the station bus and the
process bus. The process bus is the time and mission critical part connecting the Intelligent
Electronic Device (IED) (controller/protection relays) and Merging Units (MUs). In
operation, the IEDs receive a stream of data (so-called 61850 sampled values) from the
MUs. Based on the sampled values, processes and controls are triggered by the IEDs to
protect and automate the electrical substation.
Requirements regarding throughput, performance, and reliability are high and
critical. In today’s installation, this is typically achieved by over-provisioning and isolation
(no other traffic is allowed on the process bus - sampled values traffic only). In some cases,
utilities (the operators of these electrical substations) do not implement the process bus and
instead use direct cabling. This is because of concerns that network failure or congestions
could hinder or disrupt the delivery of sampled values. It comprises a substation network
(Local Area Network) which is partitioned into a station bus and a process bus.
Provided herein is a mechanism to apply TSN technologies to an IEC 68150-based
process bus and to enable stream-based policing and filtering in the switches. The
technology and sub-standard IEEE 802.1Qci defines policing and filtering on ingress ports
to protect time-sensitive flows. As described herein, IEEE 802.1Qci policies are applied to
protect the process bus in a domain-specific manner, rendering the switches and the TSN
network application-aware.
This may involve several measures, components, and procedures. First, the process
bus is built on deterministic Ethernet using TSN technologies (as defined in IEEE 802.1
TSN). Second, end devices (end-stations in the nomenclature of TSN) such as MUs and
IEDs are TSN-enabled. Third, sampled values are sent from the MUs to the IEDs
encapsulated in TSN streams. Fourth, in the network switches, policing and filtering
functions are applied. Fifth, the stream configuration is based on the IEC 61850 definitions.
These are well-defined in syntax and stored in Substation Configuration Language (SCL)
files.
In operation, the method to enable application-aware filtering may proceed as
follows. First, the engineering of the Substation Automation System (SAS) contains
process steps that comprise the configuration of the process of sending and receiving
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sampled values over the process bus (MUs = Sender; IEDs = Receiver) and the network
components (switches). The engineering may be established by the connection between the
IEC 61850-Engineering tool (which embeds the CUC) and the network configuration
controller.
Second, in operation, the MUs continuously send measurement data (sampled
values) to the receiving IEDs on the process bus. The MU data transmission is configured
according to IEEE 802.1 TSN as streams using specific header information (e.g., VLAN,
Multicast MAC Address, etc.). The configuration is based on the process of substation
engineering. In existing installations using standard Ethernet (best effort), sampled values
are sent using multicast addresses which requires complex filtering on the switches.
Third, the network switches in the process bus are pre-configured according to the
step in the process of substation engineering. They are aware of sending entities (endstations), amount of traffic, and timing (scheduling) aspects. In operation, the switches are
fully application aware. Being application aware and having detailed information on the
traffic allows the application of granular security policies.
Fourth, based on the pre-configured awareness, the switches implement IEEE
802.1Qci (per-stream filtering and policing). Using the provided information, the switches
may identify any defective or intrusive talker (e.g., MU, IED, switch in the process bus,
etc.). The applied ingress policing uses filters that can block or limit excessive amounts of
sampling data. There are configurable options such as per stream filtering. In essence, this
application-aware policing and filtering mechanism ensures that any faulty device,
defective or intrusive, does not impact the pre-configured critical sampled-valuetraffic/stream.
Fifth, filtering, frame-counting, and policing may be defined in IEEE 802.1Qci
(per-stream filtering and policing). Using the engineering data to configure the filtering
and policing enables granular detection of faulty, defective or hostile devices. Engineering
and configuration of a TSN-enabled process bus allows the operation of a converged multiservice network. In other words, it is possible and secure to place other traffic (e.g., best
effort, Internet of Things (IoT), etc.) on the process bus without any impact on the critical
sampled value transmission.
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Sixth, the entire configuration process and setup is agile and highly configurable
and adaptive. Any change in the measurement configuration of the MUs and in the resulting
transmission is performed and captured in the engineering tool, and triggers a change in
the configuration of the end devices and the network components.
Figure 1 depicts an example overall architecture of a deterministic process bus.
Switches and IEDs are TSN-enabled. The CUC is part of the IEC 61850-Engineering tool.
The network controller updates the TSN-configurations each time a change in the SAS
occurs. Stream filtering ensures critical sampled value transmission.

Figure 1
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Figure 2 below depicts the adaptive and application driven filtering and policing
for one gate within a switch.

Figure 2

The techniques described herein provide protection from misconfiguration in end
devices (IEDs, MUs) and switches, security incidents/attacks (e.g., Denial of Service (DoS),
Distributed DoS (DDoS), etc.), babbling MUs, and/or network congestion. They also
enable a converged process bus to share the network with other traffic (e.g., IoT traffic,
video, voice, etc.).
In general, the use of deterministic networking technologies to protect critical
automation and control traffic and to ensure high availability and reliability can help
increase the adoption of the process bus in networks based on IEC 61850. This may help
overcome concerns regarding use of Ethernet for underlying critical processes. Indeed, this
is exactly the concern (and requirement) raised by the IEC 61850 user group (utilities)
regarding the use of process bus technologies in substation automation.
In summary, techniques are described herein to facilitate deterministic networking
based on TSN for SANs. The use of adaptive configuration of filtering and policing for
TSN-streams allows the implementation and operation of a secure converged process bus
architecture and supports the approach of a fully digital substation.
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